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The volume of research specifically directed at lodging 
real estate investment trusts (REITs) is slender, 
although numerous studies have been conducted on 
REITs generally. Studies of REITs generally have found 
that regulatory requirements disperse ownership and 
focus management’s attention on its position as the 
shareholders’ agents. While REITs have carried more 
uncertainty of results than conventional real estate 
investments, they remain a vehicle for relatively small 
investors to participate in large real estate holdings. 
Despite the presence and apparent success of lodging 
REITs, no study has specifically addressed which own-
ership format is most suited to the hotel industry.
Keywords:  real estate investment trusts; lodging 
REITS; corporate finance; asset 
pricing
Created by the U.S. Congress in 1960, real estate investment trusts (REITs) have become an important segment of the U.S. economy 
and investment markets. REITs have seen their equity 
market capitalization soar from $5 billion to roughly 
$271 billion in just the past twenty-five years. In the 
process, that growth has set the stage for the adoption 
of the REIT approach to securitized real estate across 
the globe. The REIT industry has evolved dramati-
cally over the past twenty years, so that major REITs 
today are actively engaged in operations through 
vertically integrated asset management. A typical 
vertical articulation in a single firm may span such 
functions as raw land acquisition and development, 
portfolio management, and operational-level prop-
erty-tenant services.
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REITs deserve our attention because 
studying their performance helps us 
understand better the value of commercial 
properties, which account for a significant 
proportion of the world’s wealth. In addi-
tion, REIT stocks are often not covered 
in the finance literature. Even though 
REITs are traded on public exchanges, 
many finance researchers specifically 
exclude REITs from their samples, in part 
perhaps because REITs behave differently 
from other stocks in general financial 
markets.
The objective of this article is to sum-
marize recent findings regarding REITs. 
The scope of research involving REITs 
has expanded substantially in recent years, 
and REITs provide a laboratory in which 
to study long-standing issues in financial 
markets and corporate finance. More than 
140 articles on REITs were summarized 
by Corgel, McIntosh, and Ott (1995), and 
that work has been updated by Zietz, Sir-
mans, and Friday (2003). H. Chan, Erick-
son, and Wang (2003) have also done an 
intensive literature survey on the structure 
and performance of REITs. Recent studies 
examining REITs are organized into two 
major categories: (1) corporate financing 
decisions of REITs and (2) REIT pricing, 
performance, and financial market impli-
cations. This article examines previous 
studies with an emphasis on post-2003 
publications in finance and real estate 
journals, and offers a brief discussion of 
lodging REITs. In the course this discus-
sion I lay out a research agenda for this 
sector. After introducing the REIT insti-
tutional background, I review the litera-
ture on corporate finance–related issues 
and then pricing and financial market 
implications. Finally, I focus specifically 
on lodging REITs, which own and often 
operate hotels, motels, and resorts.
Institutional Background 
of REITs
REITs make it possible for investors at 
all levels to invest in large-scale, income-
producing real properties by offering 
shares that function much like other liquid 
securities. To make REITs a more attractive 
investment, Congress waived corporate-
level income taxes on REITs if they qualify 
under certain tax provisions—chiefly, that 
they disburse nearly all of their earnings 
as dividends. REITs are not taxed directly 
on their earnings, but the distributed earn-
ings do represent taxable dividend income 
to shareholders.
Regulatory Constraints 
on REITs
A firm must meet several requirements 
to become a REIT. Although these require-
ments change over time, they can be grouped 
roughly into the following four categories:
•• Distribution•requirements: At least
90 percent of a REIT’s annual taxable
income must be distributed to share-
holders as dividends.1
•• Asset•requirements: In each quarter, at
least 75 percent of the value of a REIT’s
assets must consist of real estate proper-
ties, mortgages, cash, and government
securities.2
•• Income• requirements: Annually, at
least 75 percent of a REIT’s gross
income must be derived from income
related to real estate, such as rents from
real property, mortgage interest, divi-
dends from other REIT holdings, or
gains from property sales. Addition-
ally, at least 95 percent of the gross
1. Before 2001, the minimum dividend payout ratio was constrained at 95 percent.
2. Since 2001, real estate investment trusts (REITs) have been allowed to own taxable REIT subsidiaries (TRSs),
which engage in servicing tenants. However, no more than 25 percent of a REIT’s assets can consist of TRS.
AUGUST 2010 Cornell Hospitality Quarterly  417
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS  HOTEL ASSET MANAGEMENT 
income must be derived from the 
above-listed sources, but it can also 
include other passive forms of income 
such as dividends and interest from 
non–real estate sources, such as bank 
deposit interest.3
•• Ownership•requirements: A REIT can-
not be a closely held corporation. 
Shares in a REIT must be transferable 
and must be held by a minimum of one 
hundred persons. No more than 50 per-
cent of a REIT’s stock may be held by 
five or fewer distinct shareholders.4 
This is known as the 5/50 rule.
A company is prohibited from repeatedly 
switching its REIT status to minimize taxes. 
If a company loses its qualified status, the 
IRS can demand back taxes and interest on 
those taxes, and perhaps penalties. The com-
pany will also be barred from becoming a 
REIT for at least five years.
REITs are categorized into these three 
types:
1. equity REITs (investing in real proper-
ties, such as industrial, office, retail,
multifamily, lodging, and other types);
2. mortgage REITs (lending or investing
in mortgage/mortgage-backed securi-
ties); and
3. hybrid REITs (a combination of the
above two types).
Becoming a REIT is simply a tax status 
election. Publicly traded REITs are governed 
by the same SEC and listing regulations as 
other publicly traded stocks. Going public 
is a separate decision from the decision to 
become a REIT. Exhibit 1 shows the evolu-
tion of public REITs in term of numbers of 
firms and total assets.
Corporate Finance Issues 
Involving REITs
Capital Structure
The academic corporate finance literature 
has explored the effects of taxes on a firm’s 
capital structure in great detail. Theory sug-
gests that there is a significant tax gain to be 
realized from corporate borrowing. Firms 
balance benefits (e.g., tax savings) against 
costs (e.g., deadweight bankruptcy costs) 
from debt. Howe and Shilling (1988) claim 
that there is a strong tax disadvantage to the 
use of debt for non-tax-paying firms, since 
these firms must compete in debt markets 
with firms for which interest expenses result 
in tax savings. Because they can count on a 
tax deduction, tax-paying firms can afford 
to pay higher interest on debt. Due to their 
tax-exempt status, the researchers argue, 
REITs should involve little or no debt financ-
ing. Jaffe (1991) disputes that reasoning and 
shows that the tax code is only one factor 
explaining leverage. Under general condi-
tions, Jaffe’s model shows that the values of 
REITs do not vary with leverage.
Rather than simply focus on total debt, 
Brown and Riddiough (2003) provide a 
detailed examination of the debt structure 
of REITs. They believe that firms adjust 
their leverage ratios towards optimal target 
levels and that each incremental financing 
activity is undertaken to adjust a firm’s over-
all leverage to reach its target level. Brown 
and Riddiough find in addition that public 
debt is typically used to reconfigure a 
REIT’s liability structure to maintain its 
credit rating, while equity offerings are 
more likely to fund investment. Consistent 
with Brown and Riddiough, Hardin and 
3. No more than 30 percent of the gross income can be derived from the sale of stocks or securities held for
less than six months or the disposition of real properties held for less than four years other than properties
involuntarily converted or foreclosed on.
4. With the “look-through” provision enacted in 1993, pension funds are considered for the purpose of this
rule to represent as many owners as there are pension plan members. Thus, in effect, institutional investors
are not limited by this ownership requirement.
HOTEL ASSET MANAGEMENT  REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
418  Cornell Hospitality Quarterly AUGUST 2010
E
xh
ib
it
 1
:
H
is
to
ri
ca
l R
E
IT
 In
d
u
st
ry
 M
ar
ke
t 
C
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n
: 1
97
1-
20
09
C
o
m
p
o
si
te
 
E
q
u
it
y 
M
o
rt
ga
g
e 
H
yb
ri
d
E
n
d
 o
f 
N
u
m
b
er
 
M
ar
ke
t 
N
u
m
b
er
 
M
ar
ke
t 
N
u
m
b
er
 
M
ar
ke
t 
N
u
m
b
er
 
M
ar
ke
t 
Ye
ar
 
o
f 
R
E
IT
s 
C
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n
 
o
f 
R
E
IT
s 
C
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n
 
o
f 
R
E
IT
s 
C
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n
 
o
f 
R
E
IT
s 
C
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n
19
71
 
34
 
1,
49
4.
30
 
12
 
33
2.
00
 
12
 
57
0.
80
 
10
 
59
1.
60
19
72
 
46
 
1,
88
0.
90
 
17
 
37
7.
30
 
18
 
77
4.
70
 
11
 
72
8.
90
19
73
 
53
 
1,
39
3.
50
 
20
 
33
6.
00
 
22
 
51
7.
30
 
11
 
54
0.
20
19
74
 
53
 
71
2.
40
 
19
 
24
1.
90
 
22
 
23
8.
80
 
12
 
23
1.
70
19
75
 
46
 
89
9.
70
 
12
 
27
5.
70
 
22
 
31
2.
00
 
12
 
31
2.
00
19
76
 
62
 
1,
30
8.
00
 
27
 
40
9.
60
 
22
 
41
5.
60
 
13
 
48
2.
80
19
77
 
69
 
1,
52
8.
10
 
32
 
53
8.
10
 
19
 
39
8.
30
 
18
 
59
1.
60
19
78
 
71
 
1,
41
2.
40
 
33
 
57
5.
70
 
19
 
34
0.
30
 
19
 
49
6.
40
19
79
 
71
 
1,
75
4.
00
 
32
 
74
3.
60
 
19
 
37
7.
10
 
20
 
63
3.
30
19
80
 
75
 
2,
29
8.
60
 
35
 
94
2.
20
 
21
 
50
9.
50
 
19
 
84
6.
80
19
81
 
76
 
2,
43
8.
90
 
36
 
97
7.
50
 
21
 
54
1.
30
 
19
 
92
0.
10
19
82
 
66
 
3,
29
8.
60
 
30
 
1,
07
1.
40
 
20
 
1,
13
3.
40
 
16
 
1,
09
3.
80
19
83
 
59
 
4,
25
7.
20
 
26
 
1,
46
8.
60
 
19
 
1,
46
0.
00
 
14
 
1,
32
8.
70
19
84
 
59
 
5,
08
5.
30
 
25
 
1,
79
4.
50
 
20
 
1,
80
1.
30
 
14
 
1,
48
9.
40
19
85
 
82
 
7,
67
4.
00
 
37
 
3,
27
0.
30
 
32
 
3,
16
2.
40
 
13
 
1,
24
1.
20
19
86
 
96
 
9,
92
3.
60
 
45
 
4,
33
6.
10
 
35
 
3,
62
5.
80
 
16
 
1,
96
1.
70
19
87
 
11
0 
9,
70
2.
40
 
53
 
4,
75
8.
50
 
38
 
3,
16
1.
40
 
19
 
1,
78
2.
40
19
88
 
11
7 
11
,4
35
.2
0 
56
 
6,
14
1.
70
 
40
 
3,
62
0.
80
 
21
 
1,
67
2.
60
19
89
 
12
0 
11
,6
62
.2
0 
56
 
6,
76
9.
60
 
43
 
3,
53
6.
30
 
21
 
1,
35
6.
30
19
90
 
11
9 
8,
73
7.
10
 
58
 
5,
55
1.
60
 
43
 
2,
54
9.
20
 
18
 
63
6.
30
19
91
 
13
8 
12
,9
68
.2
0 
86
 
8,
78
5.
50
 
28
 
2,
58
6.
30
 
24
 
1,
59
6.
40
19
92
 
14
2 
15
,9
12
.0
0 
89
 
11
,1
71
.1
0 
30
 
2,
77
2.
80
 
23
 
1,
96
8.
10
19
93
 
18
9 
32
,1
58
.7
0 
13
5 
26
,0
81
.9
0 
32
 
3,
39
8.
50
 
22
 
2,
67
8.
20
19
94
 
22
6 
44
,3
06
.0
0 
17
5 
38
,8
12
.0
0 
29
 
2,
50
2.
70
 
22
 
2,
99
1.
30
19
95
 
21
9 
57
,5
41
.3
0 
17
8 
49
,9
13
.0
0 
24
 
3,
39
5.
40
 
17
 
4,
23
2.
90
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
AUGUST 2010 Cornell Hospitality Quarterly  419
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS  HOTEL ASSET MANAGEMENT 
E
xh
ib
it
 1
: 
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
C
o
m
p
o
si
te
 
E
q
u
it
y 
M
o
rt
ga
g
e 
H
yb
ri
d
E
n
d
 o
f 
N
u
m
b
er
 
M
ar
ke
t 
N
u
m
b
er
 
M
ar
ke
t 
N
u
m
b
er
 
M
ar
ke
t 
N
u
m
b
er
 
M
ar
ke
t 
Ye
ar
 
o
f 
R
E
IT
s 
C
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n
 
o
f 
R
E
IT
s 
C
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n
 
o
f 
R
E
IT
s 
C
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n
 
o
f 
R
E
IT
s 
C
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n
19
96
 
19
9 
88
,7
76
.3
0 
16
6 
78
,3
02
.0
0 
20
 
4,
77
8.
60
 
13
 
5,
69
5.
80
19
97
 
21
1 
14
0,
53
3.
80
 
17
6 
12
7,
82
5.
30
 
26
 
7,
37
0.
30
 
9 
5,
33
8.
20
19
98
 
21
0 
13
8,
30
1.
40
 
17
3 
12
6,
90
4.
50
 
28
 
6,
48
0.
70
 
9 
4,
91
6.
20
19
99
 
20
3 
12
4,
26
1.
90
 
16
7 
11
8,
23
2.
70
 
26
 
4,
44
1.
70
 
10
 
1,
58
7.
50
20
00
 
18
9 
13
8,
71
5.
40
 
15
8 
13
4,
43
1.
00
 
22
 
1,
63
2.
00
 
9 
2,
65
2.
40
20
01
 
18
2 
15
4,
89
8.
60
 
15
1 
14
7,
09
2.
10
 
22
 
3,
99
0.
50
 
9 
3,
81
6.
00
20
02
 
17
6 
16
1,
93
7.
30
 
14
9 
15
1,
27
1.
50
 
20
 
7,
14
6.
40
 
7 
3,
51
9.
40
20
03
 
17
1 
22
4,
21
1.
90
 
14
4 
20
4,
80
0.
40
 
20
 
14
,1
86
.5
1 
7 
5,
22
5.
00
20
04
 
19
3 
30
7,
89
4.
73
 
15
3 
27
5,
29
1.
04
 
33
 
25
,9
64
.3
2 
7 
6,
63
9.
37
20
05
 
19
7 
33
0,
69
1.
31
 
15
2 
30
1,
49
0.
98
 
37
 
23
,3
93
.7
3 
8 
5,
80
6.
61
20
06
 
18
3 
43
8,
07
1.
10
 
13
8 
40
0,
74
1.
40
 
38
 
29
,1
95
.3
0 
7 
8,
13
4.
30
20
07
 
15
2 
31
2,
00
9.
00
 
11
8 
28
8,
69
4.
60
 
29
 
19
,0
54
.1
0 
5 
4,
26
0.
30
20
08
 
13
6 
19
1,
65
1.
00
 
11
3 
17
6,
23
7.
70
 
20
 
14
,2
80
.5
0 
3 
1,
13
2.
90
20
09
 
14
2 
27
1,
19
9.
20
 
11
5 
24
8,
35
5.
20
 
23
 
22
,1
03
.2
0 
4 
74
0.
80
S
ou
rc
e:
 N
at
io
na
l A
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
 o
f 
R
ea
l E
st
at
e 
In
ve
st
m
en
t T
ru
st
s.
N
ot
e:
 T
hi
s 
ta
bl
e 
sh
ow
s 
hi
st
or
ic
al
 r
ea
l e
st
at
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t t
ru
st
 (
R
E
IT
) 
eq
ui
ty
 m
ar
ke
t c
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n 
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g 
at
 y
ea
r-
en
d 
fr
om
 1
97
1 
to
 2
00
9.
 N
um
be
rs
 a
re
 in
 m
il
li
on
s 
of
 d
ol
la
rs
.
HOTEL ASSET MANAGEMENT  REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
420  Cornell Hospitality Quarterly AUGUST 2010
Wu (2009) find that REITs with banking 
relationships tend to operate with lower 
leverage.
Another popular explanation of a firm’s 
capital structure is the “pecking order” the-
ory, which states that firms prioritize their 
sources of financing. The order is as follows: 
internal funds are used first; when that 
source is depleted, debt is issued; and when 
the debt capacity is reached, equity is issued. 
Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007) find that 
REITs with historically high market-to-book 
ratios tend to have persistently high leverage 
ratios. In essence, REITs enjoying strong 
growth opportunity and high market valua-
tion raise funds through debt issues.
Using a sample of REIT issuance deci-
sions, Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (forthcom-
ing) conclude that REITs strategically time 
the market when they adjust their capital 
structures. REITs operate in one of the few 
industries in which a firm’s underlying assets 
trade in a secondary market. Therefore, ana-
lysts are able to obtain a mark-to-market 
measure of a firm’s assets, the net asset value 
(NAV), as an alternative measure on the 
equity market. Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu find 
that a REIT is more likely to issue equity 
when its price-to-NAV ratio is high. Consis-
tent with traditional market timing, REITs are 
more likely to issue equity after experiencing 
large price increases. Counter to the results 
of Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007), though, 
Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu find no evidence 
that the static pecking order plays an impor-
tant role in REIT financing decisions.
The illiquidity of corporate assets repre-
sents a significant private cost to firms that 
choose to finance with debt. When a firm 
is in distress and has to liquidate its assets, 
potential industry buyers in the same indus-
try are likely experiencing similar business 
difficulties and thus cannot pay full value 
for the assets. This effect of liquidation val-
ues on corporate debt capacity predicts that 
firms with relatively more liquid assets will 
prefer debt financing to equity. Giambona, 
Harding, and Sirmans (2008) find that evi-
dence from the REIT industry supports the 
above hypothesis and report that REITs spe-
cializing in shorter lease maturity assets 
(higher liquidation value) use more leverage 
and longer debt maturity.
Corporate Governance
In the past few years, corporate gover-
nance issues have attracted considerable 
attention, particularly as they relate to issues 
of managers as agents. REITs offer a natural 
experiment through which to test corporate 
governance hypotheses due to their special 
legal and organizational structure. One of the 
most restrictive legal requirements is the 
90 percent mandatory payout, which leaves 
little free cash flow for management. This 
legal obligation limits the opportunities for 
managerial expropriation and reduces agency 
problems. Hartzell, Kallberg, and Liu (2005) 
find that REITs with stronger governance 
structures have high initial public offering 
(IPO) valuations and better long-term operat-
ing performance than do their peers.
Another hypothesis states that the legal 
setting in which REITs operate should be 
complemented by internal corporate gover-
nance mechanisms to prevent managerial 
entrenchment and thus reduce agency prob-
lems. The 5/50 rule is designed to prevent the 
entrenchment of a small block of holders. 
Eichholtz and Kok (2008) argue that the 5/50 
rule deters the formation of large block hold-
ers and protects REIT managers from the 
scrutiny of the market for corporate control.
Bauer, Eichholtz, and Kok (2009) inves-
tigate the governance-performance relation 
using the corporate governance quotient 
index. They find that corporate governance 
does not matter for firm value and operating 
performance in a sample of U.S. REITs. This 
is in contrast to the strong positive relation-
ship between governance and performance 
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found in other industries. They also find that, 
for a subsample of REITs with relatively 
low payout ratios, governance is important. 
They attribute the weakening relationship 
to the mandatory payout rule and opera-
tional restrictions, which reduce the cost 
of deviations from the optimal governance 
structure.
Hartzell, Sun, and Titman (2006) study 
the effect of corporate governance on REIT 
investment decisions. They find that REITs 
with stronger corporate governance respond 
more positively to their real estate invest-
ment opportunities after controlling for other 
factors. Specifically, investment choices are 
more closed tied to Tobin’s q (the ratio of 
stock market value to equity book value) if 
a REIT has greater institutional ownership 
or if it has lower director and officer stock 
ownership. Those results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that the independent directors 
and institutions serve a monitoring role and 
act as a check on managers’ tendency to 
overinvest.
Dividend Payout Policy
Although the 2001 tax regulations state 
that REITs are required to pay out 90 percent 
of earnings, this regulation constraint does 
not seem to be entirely binding. Bradley, 
Capozza, and Seguin (1998) report that divi-
dend payouts in their sample are on average 
about twice the net income. One reason for 
the requirement that REITs pay out most 
earnings to shareholders is that this reduces 
agency costs. It is a well-documented fact 
that managers have incentives to invest in 
negative net present value (NPV) projects 
if their compensation is related to company 
size. With limited retained earnings, REIT 
managers have to issue new debt or equity 
securities if they want to acquire a new 
building. Then the capital market will pro-
vide an effective monitoring function. 
Wang, Erickson, and Gau (1993) support 
the above hypothesis and find that REITs 
with high debt-to-asset ratios or low 
asset growth rates tend to pay out more 
dividends.
Another reason that REITs pay high divi-
dends is to signal a firm’s future cash flows. 
Standard finance textbooks say that manag-
ers should maintain a stable or increasing 
dividend-payment stream, as dividend cuts 
will be penalized by the capital market. If 
the 90 percent dividend payout constraint is 
really binding, we should observe dividend 
payouts fluctuating with REIT earnings. 
Therefore, by paying more dividends, the 
manager is essentially signaling to capital 
markets that future earnings will be higher. 
Bradley, Capozza, and Seguin (1998) find 
that REITs with greater leverage, smaller 
asset bases, or undiversified asset bases offer 
lower dividend payout rates. Because such 
firms have high cash flow volatility, it is 
more difficult for them to maintain a high 
dividend payout ratio.
Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) examine the 
influence of managerial performance, own-
ership, and governance on REIT dividend 
policies. Their analyses demonstrate that 
shareholders demand bigger dividends from 
poorly performing firms out of concern that 
managers would otherwise waste corporate 
assets on value-destroying projects. Divi-
dends are a negative function of CEO stock 
ownership and are positively affected by 
board independence and a CEO’s length of 
service.
Departing from the extant dividend pol-
icy literature, which does not differentiate 
between mandatory and nonmandatory 
dividend payments, Hardin and Hill (2008) 
study the determinants of excess dividend 
payments above mandatory requirements 
in REITs. They conclude that excess divi-
dend payments are related to factors associ-
ated with reduced agency costs, such as the 
acquisition of short-term bank debt that 
subjects the firm to additional monitoring, 
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the use of stock repurchase programs, and 
strong operating performance.
Initial Public Offerings
Investors in IPOs of common stocks in 
the United States earned, on average, about 
an 18 percent return on the first day of trading 
during the 1970 to 2000 period, indicating 
significant underpricing for industrial firm 
IPOs. However, REIT IPOs provided their 
investors only a 0.21 percent gain during the 
same period, according to Wang, Chan, and 
Gau (1992) and H. Chan, Erickson and Wang 
(2003). Noting this phenomenon, researchers 
sought to determine what is special about 
REIT IPOs and what contributes to REITs’ 
overpricing for IPOs. Ling and Ryngaert 
(1997), using a later time frame, document 
underpricing for REIT IPOs and find positive 
abnormal performance up to one hundred 
days after the offering. They indicate the fol-
lowing three possible reasons for REIT IPOs 
to behave differently from industrial firm 
IPOs: (1) the REITs have greater valuation 
uncertainty, (2) the REIT market comprises 
more institutional investors than does the 
industrial market, and (3) the organizational 
structure of REITs makes them more like a 
mutual fund IPO.
Buttimer, Hyland, and Sanders (2005) 
analyze the long-term performance of REIT 
IPOs. They find no evidence of the volatile 
post-IPO stock market performance that is 
typically found for other stocks. Taking a 
different approach, Hartzell, Kallberg, and 
Liu (2005) focused on the degree to which 
the characteristics of the underlying real 
estate markets, such as returns on unsecuri-
tized commercial real estate, dividend pay-
out, vacancy rates, and space market supply 
and demand, can help explain REIT IPO 
volume and long-term operating perfor-
mances. They find no relationship between 
the heat of the IPO market and post-IPO 
operating performance.
REIT Pricing and Performance
Because REIT shares represent securi-
tized real estate, their pricing may diverge 
from that of shares of industrial companies, 
because REITs may have different risk and 
return performance. Moreover, since REITs 
represent an alternative form of investment, 
investors might seek to know the extent to 
which REIT stocks are integrated into the 
general stock market. In short, the question 
is whether REITs are a form of real estate 
or stocks.
REIT Pricing
Gentry, Kemsley, and Mayer (2003) find 
that a firm’s value is positively related to a 
firm’s tax basis, indicating that future divi-
dend taxes are capitalized into share prices. 
They estimated that each dollar of tax basis 
increases a REIT’s share prices by nine to 
twenty-six cents, conditional on the fair mar-
ket value of properties.
In the finance literature, classical divi-
dend pricing (or present value) models are 
rejected using only dividends but accepted 
when share repurchases are included. The 
REIT mandate to pay out no less than 90 
percent of earnings provides a test of those 
models. Using an index of REITs, Kallberg, 
Liu, and Srinivasan (2003) reexamine those 
models and conclude that the dividend-
pricing models cannot be rejected.
Barkham and Geltner (1995) show that 
securitized real estate markets lead direct 
markets and conclude that direct markets 
are to some extent informationally ineffi-
cient. MacKinnon and Al Zaman (2009) find 
that REIT returns and returns to direct real 
estate both revert to the mean, which is 
caused by a tendency on the part of com-
mercial property transaction prices to over-
shoot inflation. However, at all horizons 
REITs remain riskier than direct real estate. 
REITs play little or no role in optimal port-
folios when both REITs and direct real 
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estate are available, especially for large, 
long-horizon investors.
Glascock, Lu, and So (2000) believe that 
there was a structural change in the early 
1990s due to increased participation by insti-
tutional investors. They find that equity 
REITs have behaved more like traditional 
stocks than like real estate since 1992. In 
contrast, Clayton and Mackinnon (2003) 
show that equity REIT returns become 
increasingly sensitive to the performance of 
the underlying real estate and that REIT 
stocks have behaved more like real estate 
since 1992. They also find that small-cap 
REITs behave more like real estate than do 
large-cap REITs. Finding the opposite result, 
Lee, Lee, and Chiang (2008) show that large-
cap REITs behave more like real estate than 
do small-cap REITs. They interpret the above 
results as evidence that institutional investors 
provide information-gathering services and 
strengthen the linkage between REIT returns 
and underlying real estate factors.
The development of a multifactor model 
in real estate has seen an increasing focus 
on macro-factor approaches. One of the ear-
liest works, K. C. Chan, Hendershott, and 
Sanders (1990), examines equity REIT 
returns using the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) and arbitrage pricing theory (APT) 
approaches. Chen, Hsieh, and Jordan (1997) 
compare multifactor models using macro-
economic variables with principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA) for REIT returns and 
conclude that the macro-factor model out-
performs a statistical PCA model. Ling and 
Naranjo (1997, 1999), Ling, Naranjo and 
Ryngaert (2000), and others are all in favor 
of macro-factor approaches. However, the 
macro-factor model requires proxies for the 
key systematic risk factors to be priced fairly 
in high-frequency trading. Furthermore, the 
normality assumption is frequently rejected 
when measuring commercial real estate 
return. Lizieri, Satchell, and Zhang (2007) 
revisit the statistical approach and explore 
an independent component analysis (ICA) 
approach. Their examination of individual 
REIT returns suggests that the ICA proce-
dure performs better than the PCA by con-
sidering skewness and kurtosis of return 
distribution.
Chui, Titman, and Wei (2003a, 2003b) 
examine the determinants of REIT returns 
in a multifactor framework and also find a 
structural break in the early 1990s. Before 
1990, REIT returns were associated with 
the following four factors: momentum, size, 
turnover, and analyst coverage. However, 
only momentum was a significant factor in 
the post-1990 sample.
REIT Performance
Real estate firms can choose among a 
several organizational forms, such as REIT, 
master limited partnership (MLP), business 
trust, and corporation. As I explained above, 
the REIT has tax advantages over the other 
organizational forms, but REITs also have 
tighter restrictions, notably, the mandatory 
payout requirement. Damodaran, John, and 
Liu (1997) examine changes by real estate 
firms among these four types of organiza-
tional forms: REIT, MLP, business trust, 
and corporation. They classify these forms 
according to whether changing from one to 
another is to a looser or a tighter structure; 
and they document the associated changes 
in profitability, free cash flow, debt, and 
dividends from one form to another. They 
find that firms under financial distress at 
the time of organizational form change 
move to a more flexible structure, with sub-
sequent reductions in dividends, improve-
ments in performance, and increases in asset 
sales and investment.
Several studies have explored whether 
predictability improves the performance for 
an investor with a short investment horizon—
that is, an investor who exploits only market 
timing and contemporaneous diversification 
opportunities. Liu and Mei (1994) analyzed 
the out-of-sample performance of investment 
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REITs with predictable returns and found 
that active strategies outperform passive 
ones, even after deducting transaction costs. 
This is no longer the case in more recent 
studies, such as Nelling and Gyourko (1998) 
and Ling, Naranjo, and Ryngaert (2000), who 
find it difficult to exploit predictability, par-
ticularly in the 1990s. While these studies 
focus on short-term portfolio strategies, 
Fugazza, Guidolin, and Nicodano (2009) 
investigate the welfare gains of time diver-
sification in a multiperiod setting. They find 
that diversification into REITs increases both 
the Sharpe ratio (a ratio of excess return to 
investment riskiness) and the certainty equiv-
alent of wealth for all investment horizons.
Information and REIT Performance
Damodaran and Liu (1993) study the way 
in which private information of real estate 
value spreads to the stock market via insider 
trading. REITs that choose to have their 
assets appraised provide an opportunity to 
examine how private information is used 
by insiders of the firm and how the private 
information signal operates to general stock 
market participants. There is substantial 
evidence that insider trading is present 
around corporate announcements and that 
insider trading generates abnormal stock 
returns. However, the timing and contents 
of private information are hard to measure 
and normally unobservable by researchers. 
Since REIT assets are mostly real proper-
ties, the REIT managers often hire an inde-
pendent appraiser to value the firm’s assets. 
Damodaran and Liu find that REIT insiders 
seem to trust the appraised value and trade 
on it for a profit and, in the process, reveal 
their information to outsiders. They attribute 
the informational value of appraisals to that 
fact that the independent appraisers combine 
the data from comparable properties with 
the internal data from the performance mea-
sures of REIT being appraised.
Capozza and Israelsen (2007) show evi-
dence that levels of predictability vary with 
firm size, leverage, and investment focus. 
They find that momentum is stronger for 
larger, more leveraged REITs; while reversion 
is faster for focused, leveraged REITs. Those 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that REIT information is either less costly to 
acquire or has less impact on fundamental 
value and should therefore exhibit less 
predictability.
Ambrose, Lee, and Peek (2007) study the 
information spillover effect after a REIT is 
included in a Standard & Poor’s index. Even 
though REITs have been in existence for 
more than four decades, they play only lim-
ited roles in asset allocation for general 
investors. Beginning October 2001, twenty-
one REITs were included in an S&P market 
index (i.e., S&P500, S&P400, and S&P600). 
Ambrose, Lee, and Peek use the index inclu-
sion as a natural experiment as a nonfunda-
mental event. They find that returns on 
REITs that remain outside those indexes tend 
to become more highly correlated with 
returns on general market indexes after other 
REITs join the indexes.
Subrahmanyam (2007) examines the 
liquidity and order flow spillover effect 
across New York Stock Exchange stocks 
and REITs using Granger causality tests and 
impulse-response functions. They find that 
(1) there are persistent liquidity spillovers 
running from REITs to non-REITs; (2) non-
REIT effective spreads forecast shifts in 
REIT spreads at both daily and monthly 
horizons, and this effect is economically 
significant; and (3) order flows and returns 
in the stock market negatively forecast REIT 
order flows, which is consistent with the 
view that a REIT is a substitute investment 
for the stock market investors.
Lodging REITs
Lodging REITs have had a substantial 
effect on the ownership and operation of 
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lodging properties, but one could ask 
whether REITs are a good ownership form 
for the lodging industry. Hotels and other 
such properties push the bounds of the inter-
nal revenue code’s attempts to constrain 
REITs to a passive role. The intensive daily 
operations in the hotel industry pose a chal-
lenge to the use of REITs to securitize real 
estate properties. On the positive side, REITs 
offer protection from the corporate taxes 
(and provide an income stream to sharehold-
ers). Moreover, REITs can spread the risk 
of hotel ownership over a wider financial 
and geographic base.
Although REITs have received consider-
able attention, little research has focused 
directly on lodging REITs. The first compre-
hensive discussion on lodging REITs was 
written by Paul Beals and John Arabia and 
published in Cornell•Hotel•and•Restaurant•
Administration•Quarterly in 1998. They pro-
vide an overview of REIT history and discuss 
a variety of REIT forms that have been used 
for hotel industry—in particular, the paired-
share REIT, which is unique to hotel REITs. 
A paired-share REIT is a combination of a 
REIT and a C Corporation that trades as a 
single investment unit and has the same 
shareholders. The REIT owns real estate that 
is leased to the C Corporation, a fully taxable 
entity that operates the property. At the time 
of the 1998 CQ article, four paired-share 
REITs were extant. They were Starwood 
W Lodging Trust (which had bought out 
California Jockey Club/Pay Meadows Oper-
ating Co in July 1997), Patriot American 
Hospitality, First Union Real Estate Invest-
ments, and Meditrust Corp (which had pur-
chased Santa Anita Realty Enterprises Inc in 
November 1997). These four companies did 
have their activities restricted, but since then 
the REIT Modernization Act of 1999 has 
loosened some of the restrictions and allowed 
REITs to own taxable REIT subsidiaries.
Based on a sample of sixteen hotel REITs 
and fifty-one non-REIT corporations from 
1993 to 1999, Mooradian and Yang (2001) 
find the significant differences for the two 
types of company. The non-REIT companies 
are more heavily leveraged, pay lower divi-
dends, and retain a larger amount of free 
cash flow than do the REITs.
Kim, Mattila, and Gu (2002) compare the 
performances of hotel REITs with six other 
Exhibit 3:
Lodging REIT Statistics
Hotels Rooms Market IPO 
Company Name Ticker Owned Owned Capitalization Year
Ashford Hospitality Trust AHT 103 23,255 99.5 2003
FelCor Lodging Trust FCH 89 25,656 118.2 1994
Host Hotels&Resorts HST 243 63,076 3,976.5 1953
LaSalle Hotel Properties LHO 31 8,494 453.8 1998
MHI Hospitality Cor. MDH 9 2,199 8.8 2004
Strategic Hotels&Resorts BEE 19 8,347 125 2004
Sunstone Hotel Investors SHO 44 15,029 296.3 2004
DiamondRock Hospitality DRH 20 9,586 456.6 2005
Pebblebrook Hotel Trust PEB NA NA NA 2009
Hersha Hospitality Trust HT 76 9,556 144.8 1999
Hospitality Properties Trust HPT 289 42,881 1,397.7 1995
Supertel Hospitality SPPR 123 10,702 35.6 1994
Source: SNL financial.
Note: As of end of 2008. REIT = real estate investment trust.
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REIT sectors, as well as the overall stock mar-
ket. They find that hotel REITs carry the high-
est market risk and underperformed office, 
industrial, and diversified REIT sectors.
Gu and Kim (2003) extend the Kim, 
Mattila, and Gu (2002) study and further 
research the determinants of the unsystem-
atic risk of U.S. hotel REIT firms. They 
show that high leverage and high dividend 
payout tend to magnify the unsystematic 
risk, where large capitalization helps miti-
gate the unsystematic risk. Their results 
suggest that hotel REITs should use less 
debt financing and should consolidate via 
mergers and acquisitions.
Conclusions
The research record of REITs for the 
lodging industry is all too short. Given that 
hospitality REITs are well established, one 
question is whether public REITs are, in fact, 
a good form of ownership for hotels; and 
another is what factors should apply as one 
compares a lodging REIT with a hotel oper-
ating company. Given the diversity of own-
ership forms, the lodging industry is a fruitful 
area for research in this area. In this regard, 
Sunstone Hotel Investors has an interesting 
story to tell. Formed in 1985, Sunstone 
became a publicly trade REIT in 1995. Four 
years later, Sunstone was taken private in a 
management buyout with Westbrook Part-
ners, a private equity firm. The company 
made an IPO again five years later, in Octo-
ber 2004, when the equity market was more 
favorable. Clearly, the principals saw a ben-
efit to these changes. Their experience raises 
the questions of whether the REIT’s tax ben-
efits offset the regulatory requirements. 
Research might examine the pros and cons 
of REIT ownership versus that of a regular 
corporation and how performance under dif-
ferent ownership structures varies in differ-
ent phases of the economic cycle. Those are 
potential research areas that have not 
explored in the lodging industry.
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